Marxism and the Future of Science
How dialectical materialism provides a practical philosophy and critique of science
Marxist philosophy has been shown throughout history to be a powerful and flexible schema for many forms of scientific inquiry. Also known as dialectical materialism, this philosophy of science is based on a critical, practical materialism that understands scientific work as a part of social activity, economy and practical life while emphasising the utility of a contextualised empirical enquiry. Although often muted within the contemporary discourse, the Marxist philosophy of science has been exemplified in a variety of impactful scientific projects and provides a strong critique of science where existing critical philosophies may fall short. This essay argues that dialectical materialism provides a fruitful methodology for scientific practice and a critical approach to science that surpasses the shortcomings of traditional scientific empiricism and constructivist approaches alike. To demonstrate this argument, this essay first briefly outlines the basic principles of dialectical materialism as a philosophy of science. Secondly, this essay demonstrates the Marxist critique of reductive empiricism by providing practical examples of dialectical materialism in contemporary science. Finally, this essay compares the Kuhnian foundations of the critical philosophy of constructivism with dialectical materialism.
The principles of dialectical materialism in science
At its foundation, Marxist philosophy emphasises the dialectical nature of reality. As such, scientific enquiry guided by dialectical materialism often differs significantly from traditional empiricism in the kinds of matters it investigates, the observations it makes and the theoretical structures it generates. One practical premise of this approach to science is the understanding that thought and the creation of ideas are “directly interwoven with the material activity” of society (Marx, 2022. p 6). This premise arises from the dialectical notion that thought itself is a particular mode of expression of reality. As a result, a dialectical materialist science emphasises the fundamental connections between the social ordering of science, its dynamic place in society and the content of the knowledge produced through scientific research. Additionally, the dialectical materialist perspective tends against reductionism. Rather than perceiving the universe as a collection of discrete but interacting categories of matter and phenomena, the dialectical perspective understands these categories themselves to be historically contingent, frozen descriptions of reality - “a collection of dead facts” (ibid). As such, a dialectical materialist science emphasises both the transformative processes that give rise to matter and phenomena, and the interconnected, interdependent nature of matter and phenomena. As J.D Bernal (1937) asserts, this perspective on reality alerts the dialectical science to the ways in which their research, theories and ideas are enmeshed in broader society. This allows dialectical science to reflect on the ideas, social structures and resources at hand in any given research process, which engenders the critique of existing theoretical schemas and concepts while encouraging the development of new ones. Ultimately, a dialectical materialist science retains the empirical methods of science so far developed, while emphasising the contextual and contingent nature of observations, theories and modes of research (ibid) in what may be referred to as a contextualised empiricism.
Beyond providing a description of reality and a critique of existing modes of scientific enquiry, dialectical materialism also views science as playing a special and often revolutionary role in social development. The transformative potential of science is made clear throughout the body of early Marxist scholarship, as the impacts of scientific development in its dialectical relationship with production are central. In Dialectics of Nature, Engels traces the development of various branches of science — from astronomy to mechanics, botany to physics etc — which are presented with goals and materials presented by broader social, agricultural or industrial conditions. These conditions are portrayed as both general, such as the agriculturalist drive to understand seasons through astronomy, and highly specific. such as the sophisticated instruments developed for industry that facilitated the birth of experimental science (Engels, 1934). Engels also explores the dialectical relationships between modes of thought, forms of economic organisation and scientific achievement. In his famous critique of Darwin’s theory of natural selection, Engels remarks on the “bitter satire” that Darwin unintentionally created when he observed the natural world and saw the precepts of capitalist political economy, like competition and the struggle for limited resources as the “normal state of the animal kingdom” (Ibid, p. 35). The tendency for natural sciences to draw from and validate the social and political structures of their given societies is a recurring theme throughout this critical body of literature.
Interestingly, Engels’s reflections also draw from evolutionary theory to include an analysis of the transformation of the material world alongside the development of cognitive structures, then later, science. He remarks on the parallel development of the faculty of speech in humankind with the rapid expansion of human cognitive capacity. Similarly, Engels suggests that the “specialisation of the hand... implies the tool”, which in turn brings to bear the multiplication of human influence on the natural world. This biosocial and technological map of physical transformation contains the central kernel of dialectical materialism - that social, cognitive and biological forms, the state of nature, and scientific development are all essentially entwined, co-developing at all stages of their history. Lastly, this account also asserts that the development of science has so transformed the world that the impacts of human works could only be negated through the world’s complete destruction (Ibid, pp. 14,15). Marx similarly writes extensively on the transformative impact of science and technology on production throughout the development of capitalism. In Marx’s view, “the application of... science to production” has cyclically upended vast social formations throughout capitalist history, primarily by revolutionising modes of production (Marx, 1939. p. 624). Furthermore, Marx identifies that in the capitalist system, the development of science and technology is pressed into the service of production, to the point where the “analysis... of mechanical and chemical laws”, and the invention of new, transformative technologies becomes a business in and of itself. Importantly, while Marx’s account shows the transformative potential of science and technology, he also reaffirms its origin within the material conditions of society, such that are set by existing and historical modes of cognitive and economic production (Ibid, p. 623).
As a revolutionary project, dialectical materialism combines the above- outlined notions; that reality itself exists within dialectical structures; that this structure can be apprehended with a contextualised empiricism, comprised of social and historical understanding, applied with scientific principles, and; that the self-conscious application of a dialectical materialist science contains the radical potential to transform social reality, reinforce or tear down existing cognitive structures and fundamentally reshape the development of scientific knowledge. Some critical questions remain, however: What can the revolutionary ideas of Marxist philosophy offer contemporary science? Can a Marxist philosophy of science provide a perspective that overcomes the intractable problems of contemporary philosophies of science? The remainder of this essay explores these questions, arguing that Marxist philosophy does indeed hold significant promise for contemporary scientific practice, and provides a viable theory of knowledge without the shortcomings of other major philosophical approaches to science.
Dialectical materialism in contemporary science - an expansionist empiricism
The dialectical materialist schema of science has found its expression in a significant volume of contemporary science, and across a range of scientific disciplines. Throughout the 20th Century, dialectical materialism found particular purchase in the field of biology. In 1924, Soviet biologist Aleksandr Oparin famously applied the principles of dialectical materialism to hypothesise on the origins of life on Earth. In his seminal paper, Oparin explicitly drew from Engels’s writings on biology as the basis of his theoretical approach to the question of life’s origins. In particular, Oparin drew on the dialectical principle of the transformation of quantitative change into qualitative change, which led him to the hypothesis that the basic building blocks of life could be formed from inorganic matter and chemical reactions in the aqueous environments of primordial earth (Woods et al, 2003. pp. 23 - 24). Importantly, it was Oparin’s familiarity with the philosophy of dialectical materialism that encouraged him to consider the origins of life as an appropriate problem for scientific inquiry. This is because the Marxist philosophy of science is materialist at its core, and thus does not attribute a special ‘essence’ to life, nor any immaterial features that separate basic living matter from non-living matter. This hypothesis was also independently presented by British biologist John Haldane in 1929, who himself was a well-known Marxist philosopher and activist. Despite the gravity of the question of the origins of life, Oparin and Haldane’s hypotheses were not experimentally investigated until the Miller-Urey experiment, which attempted to recreate a primordial Earth environment to show how basic organic matter could arise from inorganic matter (Ibid, pp. 25 - 39). In this historic case, the Marxist principle of the transformation of quantitative change to qualitative change enabled Oparin to formulate a novel approach to a hugely important question, and one that was previously unavailable to science (Ibid, p. 26). As such, the dialectical materialist approach can be a fruitful schema for opening up new realms of scientific research.
Biologist Richard Lewontin has also employed the approach of dialectical materialism in his scientific work. In his text, Triple Helix: Gene, Organism and Environment Lewontin polemically argues against what he sees as the tendency towards analytical reductivism that is prevalent in the field of biology. This tendency, Lewontin asserts, is owed in part to the influential Cartesian metaphor of the machinic nature of the natural world (Lewontin, 2000. p. 71). Lewontin recounts how this machine metaphor dominates many different topics of research in the field of biology - from the translation of DNA into proteins, to the development of biological features, to the evolution of traits in a population. As he asserts, this mechanistic approach to questions of biology leads researchers to search for direct, causal relationships between systems that can be effectively isolated and understood in enough precision from which to generate facts of biology. However, Lewontin argues that this tendency to produce simple explanations of the complex systems under biological research — this reductive empiricism — has been the cause of numerous scientific disputes within the discipline. Lewontin offers several major reasons for these disputes; that there is no consensus on how organisms should be analytically broken down into their ‘machine’ parts; there is a vast plurality of forces simultaneously at work in any organism; cause and effect are not always separable, and; life-processes cannot be essentialised on the basis of induction, or their historical characteristics (Ibid, pp. 75 - 76).
Lewontin’s argument emphasises how the real functioning of organisms consistently defies the reductionist methodologies typical of biological research. In the final chapter of his book, Lewontin suggests some dialectical principles for research to avoid confounding reductionism and resolve some of the disputes in the discipline. Firstly, that the research of objects, like genes, must include an understanding of their relations with other objects and phenomena of the body. Secondly, that the spatial arrangements of molecules must be understood in conjunction with their chemical makeup. Thirdly, that the external arrangement of objects, like cells, should be integrated into explanations of organism development (Lewontin, 2000. pp. 114 - 117). In each of these cases, Lewontin’s recommendations for a more fruitful kind of biological research disrupt the reductionist tendency to observe objects in their own essence and form. Instead, he suggests a more dialectical approach that emphasises the relational characteristics of phenomena in addition to their observed chemical or physical characteristics. Furthermore, Lewontin rejects the possibility of identifying universally applicable parts in the whole of an organism’s biology. This is a reflection of the principle of object/subject unity, as the selection of an object for study, like an organ, is predicated on the cognitive process of object conception in science, which in itself is historically contingent and relationally conditioned. Ultimately, Lewontin’s suggestions for a more dialectical approach to biology are aimed towards addressing the deep contentions within the discipline and may help to produce more expansive and fruitful research.
The application of dialectical materialism in science clearly carries the potential to counter the empiricist reductionism prevalent in experimental sciences. By troubling the foundational methods of science, such as the selection of definite objects of study, or the search for decisive causal relations between phenomena, dialectical materialism engenders contextualised empiricism in the investigation of reality. The above examples of contemporary dialectical materialist science show how Marxist philosophy can bring about new avenues of empirical investigation beyond the limitations of reductionism.
Critiquing the critique - Marxism and Constructivism
While the Marxist philosophy of science has been impactful in the practical work and achievements of significant scientific inquiries, it has also been applied to evaluate some of the leading critical philosophies of science in the 20th Century. One prominent contemporary critical philosophy is constructivism. This philosophy shares some features in common with the Marxist philosophy of science, including its emphasis on the essentially social character of scientific work and its focus on history and the transformation of science in society. However, the Marxist philosophy of science diverges from constructivism in a number of important ways, presenting a theory of knowledge more closely aligned with science as a material practice embedded in broader social structures and material conditions.
Firstly, the foundations of the constructivist philosophy are widely credited to Thomas Kuhn and his seminal 1962 text The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. This text takes a sociological and historical approach to the construction of scientific knowledge, with a particular emphasis on the dominant ideas, or paradigms, that characterise the worldview of scientific disciplines. Importantly, Kuhn’s work also emphasises how scientific interpretations of the world undergo periods of normalcy and revolution, such that previous scientific worldviews may be replaced by emerging, revolutionary worldviews. As a result, scientific worldviews from before and after such revolutions may be considered entirely incommensurable (Kuhn, 2012. pp. 111 - 135). Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolution depicts the activity of science as an inherently social one, emphasising the role of science education, the perceptual experiences of individual scientists, and their work within socially formulated disciplines in science. Kuhn’s model of scientific transformation also shows an idealist orientation, most prominently embodied by his use of the “gestalt switch” metaphor (ibid, p. 122). In such gestalt switch situations, transformations in scientific practice are primarily motivated by ideas - by experiences or insights that cause sudden, irreversible shifts in an individual scientist’s worldview, which in turn comes to transform their practical scientific activities and subsequently, those of the scientists around them. It is Kuhn’s emphasis on ideas as transformative moments that clashes most prominently with the theory of transformation posited by dialectical materialism. This idealist analysis tends not to include the material, economic drivers of scientific transformation, rather emphasising the motive force of scientific achievements, ideas and worldviews. Importantly, Kuhn acknowledges that “external social, economic and intellectual conditions” have some role to play in scientific development. However, Kuhn also notes that such considerations have rarely been at the centre of his analysis (ibid, preface p x). Drawing heavily from Kuhn’s work, constructivist critiques similarly tend not to focus on the broader structures of production and social organisation in analysing the historical development of science.
Importantly, dialectical materialism is not the direct inverse of Kuhn’s constructivism and does not overly focus on the role of production while ignoring the role of ideas in the history of scientific development. On the contrary, Marxist philosophy sees ideas as the direct reflection of historically specific social and economic formations. In any given society, the dominant “ruling ideas” are those that reinforce existing social formations of society and are useful for the preservation of the dominant modes of production and material life at any given historical moment (Marx, 1932. p. 19). As Uranovsky notes, these ruling ideas often find their expression within the observations of science, recounting the examples of “genetics and race theory” deployed by fascist Germany as a means of reinforcing its particular capitalist social structure (Uranovsky, 2011. p. 171). In a less extreme example, recall Engels’s critique of Darwin’s observations of the animal kingdom as a close reflection of the dominant social structure of British society in his time (Engels, 1934. p. 15). Ultimately, the dialectical materialist perspective asserts the interpenetration of ideas, production, scientific practice and material life to provide a rich, historical and social account of the development of science. In contrast, Kuhn’s emphasis on ideas has contributed to a constructivist philosophy often lacks a critical perspective on the underlying but ubiquitous material factors at play in shaping the form and content of science. As such, dialectical materialism as a philosophy of science provides a more complete and practical view of science, not as an independent activity, but as a social process embedded within the social and productive structures of society.
Dialectical materialism carries significant implications for the practical activity of science and has shown to be a fruitful and productive schema for scientific practice. At the same time, dialectical materialism provides a coherent and focused critique of scientific methodology and the social structure of science that surpasses the dominant critiques of science in contemporary discourse. This can be clearly demonstrated by the incisive criticisms developed by Marx and Engels, and in the degree to which they themselves and later Marxist theorists have paid attention to the development of science, and taken seriously its claims throughout history. Most importantly, however, the Marxist philosophy of science self-consciously forwards the possibility of mobilising science to transform society. As a result, this philosophy embraces a radical relativism with profound intellectual responsibility, asserting that; the objects of scientific activity are never ahistorical or taken for granted, but rationally and empirically conceived of through their historical relations with other objects and phenomena, including human social reality; a contextualised empiricism contains the potential to develop valid and useful ideas about reality, and; that the activity of science can be vastly enhanced by embracing its continuity with historical and economic studies and indeed with all human practical activity. To summarise the ethos of dialectical materialism as a philosophy of science, we turn to Marx:
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"The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.”
References
Bernal, J.D., 1937. Dialectical Materialism and Modern Science. Science and Society, Volume 2.
Engels, F., 1934. Dialectics of Nature. Translated by C. Dutt. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
Kuhn, T.S., 2012. The structure of scientific revolutions. University of Chicago press. Lewontin, R.C., 2000. The Triple Helix: Gene, organism, and environment. Harvard University Press.
Marx, K., 1939 [1857-61]. Grundrisse: Foundations of the critique of political economy. Translated by Martin Nicolaus. Penguin UK.
Marx, K., 1932. A Critique of The German Ideology. Translated by T. Delaney, B. Schwartz. Progress Publishers.
Marx, K. and Engels, F., 1969. Theses on Feuerbach, 1888.
Uranovsky, Y.M., 2011 (1935). Marxism and Natural Science. In Marxism and Modern Thought, Taylor & Francis Group, London.
Woods, T, & Woods, A., 2003. How Life Arose. In Reason in Revolt: Dialectical Philosophy and Modern Science, Vol 2, Algora Publishing, New York. Available from: ProQuest Ebook Central.